Using the Veto Players Theory to Explain the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes
Yu-chung Shen

Abstract
Many new democracies have designed or chosen semi-presidential constitutions. Because of this trend, research on the relationship between semi-presidentialism and the stability of governments has become a popular subject within theoretical constitutional and empirical studies. Even though there are many differences in party systems (such as triangular relationships between the president, the prime minister, and the parliament) and ideology within these countries, we can still try to compare them using a structural analysis. This paper utilizes the “Veto Players Theory” to discuss the relationship between government stability and the party system, triangular relationships, and the distance of ideology. Although many papers already discuss this subject, using the Veto Players Theory can lump these variables together to avoid the specific characteristics of each case. Moreover, the experience of Weimar Germany and Taiwan can also provide some additional points to explain government stability with the use of the veto players theory.

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